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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
This case puts at issue again an ordinance of the City
of Pittsburgh that prohibits certain speech within fifteen feet
of health care facilities. Plaintiffs Nikki Bruni, Julie
Cosentino, Cynthia Rinaldi, Kathleen Laslow, and Patrick
Malley engage in what they call “sidewalk counseling” on the
public sidewalk outside of a Pittsburgh Planned Parenthood
facility in an effort, through close conversation, to persuade
women to forego abortion services. The Plaintiffs filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, claiming that the Pittsburgh ordinance limiting
their ability to approach people near the Planned Parenthood
entrance violates their First and Fourteenth Amendments
rights. We previously upheld the City’s so-called “buffer
zone” ordinance against the same kind of challenge in Brown
v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2009). Despite
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that, the Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) –
which struck down a similar Massachusetts state law – has
sufficiently altered the constitutional analysis to compel a
different result than we reached in Brown. The District Court
disagreed, hewing to our analysis in Brown and thus largely
dismissing the Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the
Ordinance.1
We will vacate in part and affirm in part. Considered
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the First
Amendment claims are sufficient to go forward at this stage
of the litigation. The speech at issue is core political speech
entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the First
Amendment, and the City cannot burden it without first
trying, or at least demonstrating that it has seriously
considered, substantially less restrictive alternatives that
would achieve the City’s legitimate, substantial, and contentneutral interests. McCullen teaches that the constitutionality
of buffer zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving
rise to the law in each individual case – the same type of
buffer zone may be upheld on one record where it might be
struck down on another.
Hence, dismissal of claims
challenging ordinances like the one at issue here will rarely, if
ever, be appropriate at the pleading stage. Instead, factual
development will likely be indispensable to the assessment of
whether an ordinance is constitutionally permissible. We
express no view on the ultimate merits of the Plaintiffs’
claims in this case, but, following the guidance of McCullen,
1

As more fully noted herein, see infra n.5, some of the
Plaintiffs’ claims were permitted to stand but the Plaintiffs
have since voluntarily dismissed them.
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we will vacate the dismissal of the First Amendment claims
so that they may be considered after appropriate development
of a factual record. Because the First Amendment claims
cover all of the Plaintiffs’ contentions, and the Fourteenth
Amendment claim is simply a recasting of free expression
arguments, we will affirm the dismissal of that claim.
I.

BACKGROUND2
A.

The Ordinance

On December 13, 2005, Pittsburgh’s City Council
adopted Ordinance No. 49, which added Chapter 623 to the
Pittsburgh Code of Ordinances. That Chapter, titled “Public
Safety at Health Care Facilities,” went into effect later in the
month.
The part of the Ordinance that is now in dispute is
§ 623.04, which establishes a “Fifteen-Foot Buffer Zone.” It
states that:
[n]o person or persons shall knowingly
congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a
zone extending fifteen (15) feet from any
entrance to the hospital and or health care
Because the District Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’
Complaint in response to the City’s motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in setting out the
factual background here, we accept as true all facts alleged in
the Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the Plaintiffs. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
(3d Cir. 2008).
2
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facility. This section shall not apply to police
and public safety officers, fire and rescue
personnel, or other emergency workers in the
course of their official business, or to authorized
security personnel employees or agents of the
hospital, medical office or clinic engaged in
assisting patients and other persons to enter or
exit the hospital, medical office, or clinic.
Pittsburgh Pa., Code § 623.04. Although the term “health
care facility” is not defined in the Chapter, a “[m]edical
office/clinic” is defined as “an establishment providing
therapeutic, preventative, corrective, healing and healthbuilding treatment services on an out-patient basis by
physicians, dentists and other practitioners.” Id. § 623.02.
In adopting the buffer zone Ordinance, the City
Council also ratified a preamble, titled “Intent of Council,”
that described the goals the City sought to accomplish:
The City Council recognizes that access to
Health Care Facilities for the purpose of
obtaining medical counseling and treatment is
important for residents and visitors to the City.
The exercise of a person’s right to protest or
counsel against certain medical procedures is a
First Amendment activity that must be balanced
against another person’s right to obtain medical
counseling and treatment in an unobstructed
manner; and
The City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police has
been consistently called upon in at least two (2)
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locations within the City to mediate the disputes
between those seeking medical counseling and
treatment and those who would counsel against
their actions so as to (i) avoid violent
confrontations which would lead to criminal
charges and (ii) enforce existing City
Ordinances which regulate use of public
sidewalks and other conduct;
Such services require a dedicated and indefinite
appropriation of policing services, which is
being provided to the neglect of the law
enforcement needs of the Zones in which these
facilities exist.
The City seeks a more efficient and wider
deployment of its services which will help also
reduce the risk of violence and provide
unobstructed access to health care facilities by
setting clear guidelines for activity in the
immediate vicinity of the entrances to health
care facilities;
The Council finds that the limited buffer and
bubble zones outside of health care facilities
established by this chapter will ensure that
patients have unimpeded access to medical
services while ensuring that the First
Amendment rights of demonstrators to
communicate their message to their intended
audience is not impaired.

7

Id. § 623.01. Violations of the Ordinance are met with
graduated penalties, ranging from a $50 fine for a first offense
to a thirty-day maximum (and three-day minimum) jail
sentence for a fourth violation within five years. Id. § 623.05.
As originally passed, the Ordinance also included an eightfoot “floating bubble zone,” which established a 100-foot area
around clinics in which people could not be approached
without their consent within eight feet “for the purpose of
passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or
engaging in oral protest, education or counseling.” Id.
§ 623.03.
The Ordinance was challenged in court shortly after its
passage. In Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, we held that,
although the fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone and the eight-foot
floating bubble zone were each on their own constitutionally
permissible, the combination of the two imposed a faciallyunconstitutional burden on free speech. 586 F.3d at 276, 281.
On remand, the District Court issued an order permanently
enjoining enforcement of the eight-foot floating bubble zone.
Importantly for present purposes, the order also required that
the fifteen-foot buffer zone be construed to prohibit “any
person” from “picket[ing] or demonstrat[ing]” within the
fixed buffer zone.3 (App. at 150a.) The Plaintiffs challenge
the constitutionality of the law as modified by the permanent
injunction.

3

The order also required the City to provide training to
the Pittsburgh City Police concerning proper enforcement of
the Ordinance and to mark clearly the boundaries of any fixed
buffer zone.
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B.

Application of the Ordinance

Although the Ordinance applies, on its face, at all
hospitals and health care facilities in Pittsburgh, the City has
demarcated only two actual buffer zones, both outside the
entrances of facilities that provide abortion services. The
allegations in the Complaint relate primarily to the Plaintiffs’
experiences at one of those two locations – the Planned
Parenthood facility located at 933 Liberty Avenue. At the
front of that facility, a painted yellow semi-circle marks the
buffer zone boundary within which the Ordinance bans
demonstrating or picketing.
According to their Complaint, the Plaintiffs “regularly
engage in peaceful prayer, leafleting, sidewalk counseling,
pro-life advocacy, and other peaceful expressive activities”
outside of that Planned Parenthood location. (App. at 51a.)
In their sidewalk counseling, they “seek to have quiet
conversations and offer assistance and information to
abortion-minded women by providing them pamphlets
describing local pregnancy resources, praying, and …
peacefully express[ing] this message of caring support to
those entering and exiting the clinic.” (App. at 58a.) The
City reads the Ordinance to prohibit sidewalk counseling as a
form of “demonstrating” and has enforced the ban against
those who, like the Plaintiffs, would engage in counseling
within the buffer zone. The prohibition “make[s] it more
difficult [for the] Plaintiffs to engage in sidewalk counseling,
prayer, advocacy, and other expressive activities.” (App. at
60a.) Because close, personal interaction is “essential to [the
Plaintiffs’] message,” as they wish to be viewed as
counselors, “rather than to merely express [their] opposition
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to abortion or to be seen as protesting” (App. at 60a-61a), the
Ordinance frustrates effective communication of their
message. The prohibition also interferes with the Plaintiffs’
activities because they “are often unable to distinguish
patients from passer[s]by at the distance that the zones require
[the] Plaintiffs to remain.” (App. at 61a.)4
C.

Procedural History

Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court decided
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), which struck
down a Massachusetts fixed buffer zone statute as
insufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the significant
government interests asserted for it. Soon thereafter, the
Plaintiffs in this suit filed their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the City of Pittsburgh, the Pittsburgh City Council,
and the Mayor of Pittsburgh. The Plaintiffs brought facial
challenges against the Ordinance under the First
Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Press Clauses, and
4

In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs also describe
specific episodes that have occurred outside of the Liberty
Avenue Planned Parenthood, episodes in which their
counseling was interrupted. For example, Plaintiff Cosentino
stated that on one occasion a clinic escort “yelled loudly” at
her while she was speaking with a young woman outside of
the buffer zone, and multiple clinic employees then
“surrounded the young woman” and led her into the clinic.
(App. at 58a-59a.) On another occasion, Plaintiff Rinaldi
stated that a security guard stifled her speech outside of the
buffer zone while she was discussing adoption options with a
young woman.
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another facial challenge under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 They also sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent the City from enforcing the Ordinance
against them. The City responded with a motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the
Complaint for failure to state a claim.
The District Court held a hearing on the motion for a
preliminary injunction, at which the Court heard testimony
from Plaintiff Bruni and Ms. Kimberlee Evert, the CEO and
President of Planned Parenthood of Western Pennsylvania.
The parties also submitted documentary evidence. The City
submitted declarations from Evert and Ms. Paula Harris, a
“clinic escort” at the facility.6 The Plaintiffs submitted two
affidavits, one from Plaintiff Laslow and the other from their
counsel, Matthew Bowman.
The District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs’ facial challenges to the Ordinance under the
The Plaintiffs’ Complaint also included as-applied
challenges, an Equal Protection claim, and a selective
enforcement claim against the Mayor of Pittsburgh, all of
which the District Court did not dismiss. After the District
Court’s ruling, the Plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss
those remaining claims, which are, consequently, not before
us on appeal.
5

“A clinic escort is a volunteer who is trained to walk
alongside patients and their companions who want to be
accompanied as they approach or leave a health care facility.”
(App. at 152a.)
6
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First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 In addition, the Court denied the
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
The Plaintiffs then filed this timely appeal. They seek
review only of the dismissal of their First Amendment and
Due Process claims against the City and not the denial of their
preliminary injunction motion.

7

The Court also dismissed all claims against the City
Council, which the Plaintiffs do not challenge in this appeal.
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II.

DISCUSSION8
A.

Standard of Review

“[O]ur standard of review of a district court’s
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is
plenary.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d
181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, courts must “accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to
relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
While
“accept[ing] all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,”
the district court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id.
at 210-11.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the district court is
also bound not to “go beyond the facts alleged in the
Complaint and the documents on which the claims made
therein [are] based.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997). The court may,
however, rely upon “exhibits attached to the complaint and
matters of public record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993). If other “matters outside the pleadings are presented

8

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(d). When that occurs, “[a]ll parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.” Id.9 “The element that triggers the
conversion [from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion into a
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment] is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the pleader’s claim supported by extra-pleading
material.” 5C Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Civ. § 1366 (3d ed.). “The reason that a court must convert a
motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion if it
considers extraneous evidence submitted by the defense is to
afford the plaintiff an opportunity to respond.” Pension
Benefit. Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196.
The District Court here based its decision to dismiss
not only upon the allegations in the Complaint but also, it
appears, upon testimony given at the hearing and the
supplemental declarations filed by Harris, Evert, Laslow, and
Bowman.
Indeed, in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ facial
challenges to the Ordinance, the Court seems to have based
its decision entirely on its analysis of the merits of the
9

Although notice need not be express, we have
recommended that district courts provide express notice
because it “is easy to give and removes ambiguities.” In re
Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 288
n.11 (3d Cir. 1999). The City’s motion to dismiss was styled
only as a motion to dismiss and made no reference to possible
conversion into a summary judgment motion. A review of
the transcript of the motions hearing verifies that neither the
Court nor the parties ever mentioned such a conversion.
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preliminary injunction motion.10 Although it relied upon
extra-pleading materials, the Court never discussed treating
the motion as one for summary judgment.
Thus before reaching the merits, we face a difficulty.
“We have previously stated that the label a district court
places on its disposition is not binding on an appellate court.”
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339-40 (3d Cir. 1989). Because
the District Court relied, at least in part, on materials
presented outside of the pleadings, “we are constrained … to
treat the district court’s disposition of the matter pursuant to
Rule 56, and not Rule 12(b)(6).” Ford Motor Co. v. Summit
Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 1991). But the
Plaintiffs were not given the “reasonable opportunity” to
present additional evidence as was their right under Rule
12(d). That was error. “We have held that it is reversible
error for a district court to convert a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) … into a motion for summary judgment unless the
court provides notice of its intention to convert the motion
and allows an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a
summary judgment proceeding or allows a hearing.”11 Rose,
871 F.2d at 342.
10

Specifically, the District Court engaged in a careful
analysis of the merits of the Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction
motion, and then incorporated that analysis into a relatively
brief discussion of the motion to dismiss by saying only, “See
analysis supra.” (App. at 35a.)
11

It is not enough that the Plaintiffs had an opportunity
to submit evidence in connection with the preliminary
injunction motion. Even if the parties understood that the
City’s motion to dismiss was being converted to a motion for
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summary judgment, the standards governing a motion for a
preliminary injunction and a motion for summary judgment
are entirely different, and it cannot be assumed that a
response to one was meant as a response to the other. As the
Plaintiffs point out, evidence was offered only to support their
request for a preliminary injunction, and should not have been
treated as their entire defense to an improperly-converted
summary judgment motion “without giving [Plaintiffs] an
opportunity to show … that the City’s evidence fails” to
withstand proper scrutiny. (Reply Br. at 22.) With no
reflection of notice or an agreement to treat the record
developed for the preliminary injunction as being a full record
for summary judgment, conversion of the motion was not
justified. Moreover, the “undeveloped factual record” (App.
at 22a) that the District Court determined was insufficient to
support a preliminary injunction was no better developed for
purposes of summary judgment.
Even had the District Court restricted its review to the
pleadings, it erred by directly equating the standard for
evaluating a preliminary injunction with the standard
applicable to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
On a motion for a preliminary
injunction, a plaintiff bears the burden to show, among other
things, “that he is likely to succeed on the merits … .”
Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205,
210 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To withstand a motion
to dismiss, on the other hand, a plaintiff need only
demonstrate that he “may be entitled to relief under any
reasonable reading of the complaint,” Mayer v. Belichick, 605
F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010), and “[t]he defendant bears the
burden of showing that no claim has been presented,” Hedges
v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). Given the
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Nevertheless, the failure to follow the dictates of Rule
12(d) is subject to a harmless error analysis and may be
excused if no prejudice to the plaintiffs would result. Ford
Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 284-85. “Thus, even where the
opportunity to submit pertinent material is not given, a grant
of summary judgment for a defendant may be affirmed where
there is no state of facts on which plaintiff could conceivably
recover.” Id. at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
our harmless error analysis, the “standard of review … is
plenary: we may affirm if, and only if, on the basis of the
complaints filed by these plaintiffs there was no set of facts
which could be proven to establish defendants’ liability.”
Rose, 871 F.2d at 342. We therefore review the Complaint
against the motion to dismiss standard.
Neither the
documentary nor the testimonial evidence submitted below
will be considered in assessing the merits of the City’s motion
to dismiss.12
significant differences between those two standards, a
plaintiff’s failure to meet his burden on a motion for a
preliminary injunction does not mean ipso facto that the
complaint fails to state a claim.
12

The amicus brief submitted by Planned Parenthood
of Western Pennsylvania and Pittsburgh Pro-Choice Escorts
also includes a considerable amount of evidence that purports
to be testimony taken by the Pittsburgh City Council during
the original 2005 hearing on whether to adopt the Ordinance.
The testimony may be significant, as it speaks to the alleged
need for the buffer zones and the alternatives employed by
the City prior to its enactment. But we cannot consider it in
our review, as the testimony would, again, effectively convert
the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.
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B.

Merits Analysis

On appeal, the Plaintiffs’ mount facial challenges to
the Ordinance under both the Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses of the First Amendment as proscribing protected
speech, and under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment due to the Ordinance’s allegedly vesting
“unbridled discretion” in City officials. (Opening Br. at 16.)
A facial challenge “seeks to vindicate not only [a plaintiff’s]
own rights, but those of others who may also be adversely
impacted by the statute in question.” CMR D.N. Corp. v. City
of Phila., 703 F.3d 612, 623 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting City of
Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999)). A successful
as-applied challenge bars a law’s enforcement against a
particular plaintiff, whereas a successful facial challenge
results in “complete invalidation of a law.” CMR D.N. Corp.,
703 F.3d at 624. The distinction between facial and asapplied constitutional challenges, then, is of critical
importance in determining the remedy to be provided.
In evaluating a facial challenge we must look beyond
the application of an ordinance in the specific case before us.
To ultimately succeed on the merits, a plaintiff theoretically
has “to establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which [the ordinance] would be valid, or that the [ordinance]
lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). In the First Amendment context, the
Supreme Court has softened that daunting standard
Moreover, it does not appear to have been before the District
Court and is not part of the record in this case.
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somewhat, saying that a law may also be invalidated on its
face “if a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.” Id. at 473 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Despite those pronouncements, the Supreme Court has
also recognized that “the distinction between facial and asapplied challenges is not so well defined that it has some
automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings
and disposition in every case involving a constitutional
challenge.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331
(2010); see also John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194
(2010) (“The label is not what matters.”). As already stated,
the distinction goes to the breadth of the remedy provided, but
“not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 331. The Court has often considered facial
challenges simply by applying the relevant constitutional test
to the challenged statute, without trying to dream up whether
or not there exists some hypothetical situation in which
application of the statute might be valid. Doe v. City of
Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2012)
(collecting cases); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (warning courts
deciding facial challenges not to “speculate about
‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases”); Janklow v. Planned
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996)
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of cert.) (noting that the “no set
of circumstances” formulation “has been properly ignored in
subsequent cases,” and collecting cases). “[W]here a statute
fails the relevant constitutional test (such as strict scrutiny …
or reasonableness review), it can no longer be constitutionally
applied to anyone – and thus there is ‘no set of circumstances’
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in which the statute would be valid.
The relevant
constitutional test, however, remains the proper inquiry.”
Doe, 667 F.3d at 1127. We therefore consider the Plaintiffs’
facial challenge to the City’s buffer zone Ordinance by resort
to the analytical framework governing free speech claims.
1.

Free Speech Claim

That framework typically begins with an assessment of
whether the challenged law restricts speech based upon its
content. “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564,
573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Such
“[c]ontent-based prohibitions … have the constant potential
to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free
people.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542
U.S. 656, 660 (2004). To guard against that threat, the First
Amendment requires that, if a statute draws a content-based
distinction – thereby favoring some ideas over others – we
apply strict scrutiny to the challenged law. Under that
heightened
scrutiny,
the
law
is
“presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government
proves that [it is] narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226
(2015). A content-based restriction, unlike a neutral law,
must also be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means of
serving the government’s interests.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at
2535 (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, “[i]t is rare
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will
ever be permissible.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S.
Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). If,
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on the other hand, the law is content-neutral, we apply
intermediate scrutiny and ask whether it is “narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest.” Madsen v.
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994).
a.

Assuming Content Neutrality

The Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance constitutes a
content-based restriction on speech and is thus subject to
strict scrutiny. Although we held in Brown that Pittsburgh’s
buffer-zone Ordinance was content-neutral, see Brown, 586
F.3d at 275, the Plaintiffs argue that that conclusion is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s post-Brown decision in
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), which they
say changed how courts draw the line between contentneutral and content-based restrictions. In Reed, the Supreme
Court held that a town code governing the manner of display
of outdoor signs that distinguished between ideological,
political, and directional signs was an impermissible contentbased restriction on speech. In reaching that conclusion, the
Court defined content-based laws as “those that target speech
based on its communicative content … .” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at
2226. Of relevance here, the Court identified a “subtle” way
in which statutes can, on their face, discriminate based upon
content, namely by “defining regulated speech by its function
or purpose.” Id. at 2227. The Plaintiffs in the present case
contend that, in defining proscribed expression as that which
involves “demonstrating” or “picketing,” Pittsburgh’s
Ordinance runs afoul of Reed by limiting speech based upon
its intended purpose.
Although the Plaintiffs make a compelling argument
that Reed has altered the applicable analysis of content
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neutrality, we need not consider the impact of Reed because
the Complaint presents a viable free speech challenge to the
buffer-zone Ordinance under the lower standard of scrutiny to
which a content-neutral restriction on speech is subject. We
can assume the Ordinance is content-neutral, even though the
City contends we may not do so – which is ironic since the
City is the party benefitting from the assumption. The City
relies on McCullen, pointing out that the Supreme Court, in
striking down the Massachusetts buffer zone law, addressed
content-neutrality to determine the applicable level of
scrutiny. 134 S. Ct. at 2530. The Court concluded that the
Massachusetts law, which prohibited “knowingly stand[ing]”
within thirty-five feet of the entrance of facilities where
abortions are performed, id. at 2525, was a content-neutral
restriction on free expression, id. at 2534. Although the Court
recognized that it was empowered to simply assume, without
deciding, that the law was subject to a less stringent level of
scrutiny – as it ultimately struck down the statute under that
lesser scrutiny anyway – it went ahead and engaged in the
content-neutrality analysis at the first step, the “ordinary order
of operations,” because doing so would not have placed the
Court at risk of “overruling a precedent.”13 Id. at 2530.

13

To clarify the point, the Supreme Court contrasted
an earlier case, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 144546 (2014). In McCutcheon, the Court assumed a lower level
of First Amendment scrutiny in striking down a challenged
statute because deciding to apply heightened scrutiny would
have needlessly required the Court to revisit its past decisions
on the subject.
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Here, by contrast, the conclusion that the Ordinance is
a content-based restriction on speech would require us to
overrule our holding in Brown that the Ordinance imposes
only a content-neutral ban. We need not take that step,
though, as we would reverse the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’
free speech claim even under the lesser scrutiny reserved for
content-neutral restrictions on speech. Accordingly, we will
assume, as was held in Brown, that the Ordinance is content
neutral and apply the intermediate level of scrutiny due such
restrictions.14
b.

Brown and its Antecedents

To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, a content-neutral
limitation on speech “must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest.’” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at
2534 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
796 (1989)). “[B]y demanding a close fit between ends and
means, the tailoring requirement prevents the government
from too readily sacrificing speech for efficiency.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Before
McCullen, the Supreme Court had decided three cases
involving similar buffer zones at medical facilities. In the
first two of those cases – Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) and Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) – the
14

Although we do not address the issue, should it arise
and need to be addressed on remand, the District Court will
need to examine Reed and its effect on the content-neutrality
analysis to decide whether that case compels a break from
Brown’s holding that the Ordinance is a content-neutral
restriction on speech.
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Court confronted the issue in the context of injunctions
prohibiting specific individuals from interfering with public
access to clinics. It viewed both restrictions, a thirty-six foot
buffer zone in Madsen and a fifteen foot zone in Schenck, as
sufficiently narrowly tailored and thus upheld them under
intermediate scrutiny.
In Madsen, the Court noted that the thirty-six foot
buffer zone at issue in that case was created by way of
injunctive relief only after a first injunction (which enjoined
the specified protesters from blocking or interfering with
public access to the clinic) proved insufficient to serve the
government’s stated interests. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-70.
The Court also emphasized that “the state court found that
[those protesters] repeatedly had interfered with the free
access of patients and staff” to the clinic in question before
issuing the injunction, leaving the state court with “few other
options to protect access” to the clinic. Id. at 769.
Similarly, in Schenck, the Court upheld the fixed
buffer zone because “the record show[ed] that protesters
purposefully or effectively blocked or hindered people from
entering and exiting the clinic doorways, from driving up to
and away from clinic entrances, and from driving in and out
of clinic parking lots.” 519 U.S. at 380. The Schenck Court
also struck down a floating bubble zone as insufficiently
tailored to the government’s interests. Id. at 377-80. The
restriction was overbroad chiefly because of the type of
speech it restricted (leafleting and other comments on matters
of public concern) and the nature of the location (a public
sidewalk). Id. at 377. The Court emphasized the potential for
uncertainty that a floating bubble zone creates – “[w]ith clinic
escorts leaving the clinic to pick up incoming patients and
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entering the clinic to drop them off, it would be quite difficult
for a protester who wishes to engage in peaceful expressive
activities to know how to remain in compliance with the
injunction” – and the resultant “substantial risk that much
more speech will be burdened than the injunction by its terms
prohibits.” Id. at 378. In contrast with the fixed buffer zone
which was upheld, the floating zone “[could] not be sustained
on th[e] record” before the Court. Id. at 377.
In the third buffer zone case, Hill v. Colorado, the
Supreme Court held, in spite of its earlier ruling in Schenck,
that an eight-foot floating bubble zone satisfied intermediate
scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement. 530 U.S. 703, 725
(2000). The Hill Court explained the differences between the
bubble zones in the two cases. See id. at 726-27. Schenck
involved a fifteen-foot bubble zone, whereas Hill’s was eight
feet, which, the Court concluded, allowed speech “at a normal
conversational distance.” Id. at 726-27 (internal quotation
marks omitted). By the Court’s estimation, the eight-foot
zone would have no “adverse impact” on one’s ability to read
a sign, would permit oral communication “at a normal
conversational distance,” and would not “prevent a leafletter
from simply standing near the path of oncoming pedestrians
and proffering his or her material … .” Id. at 726-27 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Signs, pictures, and voice itself
can cross an 8-foot gap with ease.” Id. at 729. Additionally,
the Hill statute allowed the speaker to remain in one place
while other people passed within eight feet. Id. at 727.
Finally, the Hill statute also required that any violation be
“knowing,” so that an inadvertent breach of the zone would
not be unlawful. Id.
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Although we previously concluded in Brown that the
City’s Ordinance was sufficiently narrowly tailored, we did
so out of deference to the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Madsen and Schenck. See Brown, 586 F.3d at 276. But each
of those cases, as well as Hill, implies that the application of
intermediate scrutiny’s narrow tailoring analysis must depend
on the particular facts at issue. That implication was made
explicit in McCullen.
c.

McCullen’s Clarification of the
Law

In McCullen, the Supreme Court struck down the
Massachusetts law’s thirty-five foot buffer zone as
insufficiently narrowly tailored under intermediate scrutiny.
It concluded that the zone “burden[s] substantially more
speech than necessary to achieve the Commonwealth’s
asserted interests.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537. The Court
started its analysis by recognizing the nature of the burden the
buffer zone imposed upon the petitioners’ speech. Like the
Plaintiffs here, the petitioners in McCullen engaged in
sidewalk counseling in an effort to persuade women entering
abortion facilities to consider alternatives. Id. at 2527. Given
that mode of expression, the Court emphasized the
petitioners’ need to engage in “personal, caring, consensual
conversations” rather than “chanting slogans and displaying
signs” as a form of protest against abortion. Id. at 2536. It
was thus insufficient that the counselors could be seen and
heard at a distance by the women in the buffer zone, because
“[i]f all that the women can see and hear are vociferous
opponents of abortion, then the buffer zones have effectively
stifled petitioners’ message.” Id. at 2537.
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The limitation on their speech also occurred, as it does
here, in the quintessential public forum of public streets and
sidewalks, areas that occupy “a special position in terms of
First Amendment protection … .” Id. at 2529 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The restriction thus struck at the
heart of speech protected by the First Amendment. See id. at
2536 (“[W]hile the First Amendment does not guarantee a
speaker the right to any particular form of expression, some
forms – such as normal conversation and leafletting on a
public sidewalk – have historically been more closely
associated with the transmission of ideas than others.”).
“When the government makes it more difficult to engage in
these modes of communication, it imposes an especially
significant First Amendment burden.” Id.
Balanced against that significant burden on speech was
the means chosen to effectuate the government’s purpose.
McCullen emphasized the unusual nature of such buffer zone
laws – at the time McCullen was decided, only six (including
Pittsburgh’s) existed across the entire United States, id. at
2537 n.6 – which “raise[d] concern that the Commonwealth
ha[d] too readily forgone options that could serve its interests
just as well … .” Id. at 2537. In the Supreme Court’s view,
Massachusetts had a number of less speech-restrictive
alternatives available to address its goals: it could utilize
“existing local ordinances” banning obstruction of public
ways, id. at 2538; “generic criminal statutes forbidding
assault, breach of the peace, trespass, vandalism, and the
like,” id.; and “targeted injunctions” like those in Madsen and
Schenck, id. The Court also emphasized that the congestion
problem the Commonwealth cited arose mainly at one Boston
clinic, which did not justify “creating 35-foot buffer zones at
every clinic across the Commonwealth.” Id. at 2539.
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The Court further rejected the Commonwealth’s
contention that it “ha[d] tried other approaches, but they do
not work.” Id. Although the Commonwealth claimed it had
revised the statute because an earlier, less restrictive, version
was too difficult to enforce, the Court noted that
Massachusetts could not document a single prosecution
brought under its previous statutes “within at least the last 17
years” and “the last injunctions … date[d] to the 1990s.” Id.
The Commonwealth had thus not met its narrow-tailoring
burden because it “ha[d] not shown that it seriously undertook
to address the problem with less intrusive tools readily
available to it. Nor ha[d] it shown that it considered different
methods that other jurisdictions have found effective.” Id. In
light of the “vital First Amendment interests at stake, it [was]
not enough for Massachusetts simply to say that other
approaches have not worked.” Id. at 2540. It had to either
back up that assertion with evidence of past efforts, and the
failures of those efforts, to remedy the problems that existed
outside of the Commonwealth’s abortion clinics, or otherwise
demonstrate its serious consideration of, and reasonable
decision to forego, alternative measures that would burden
substantially less speech. The Court recognized that a buffer
zone would likely make the Commonwealth’s job easier, but
“the prime objective of the First Amendment is not
efficiency.” Id. “To meet the requirement of narrow
tailoring, the government must demonstrate that alternative
measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to
achieve the government’s interests, not simply that the chosen
route is easier.” Id. In the absence of that kind of factspecific showing, the Supreme Court struck down the buffer
zone law as insufficiently narrowly tailored under
intermediate scrutiny.
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d.

Application of Intermediate
Scrutiny to Pittsburgh’s
Ordinance

As to the government interests at stake in a case like
this, all four of the Supreme Court’s buffer zone precedents –
Madsen, Schenck, Hill, and McCullen – accepted that the
laws at issue furthered significant government interests.
Schenck identified those interests as: “protecting a woman’s
freedom to seek pregnancy-related services, ensuring public
safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets
and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting the
medical privacy of patients … .” 519 U.S. at 372. Here, the
statement of intent of the Pittsburgh City Council asserts the
same kinds of justifications: ensuring patients have
“unimpeded access to medical services,” eliminating the
“neglect” of other law enforcement needs, and letting the City
provide “a more efficient and wider deployment of its
services.” Pittsburgh Pa., Code § 623.01. Consistent with
Schenck, we held in Brown that the Ordinance served
significant governmental interests. 586 F.3d at 276. Nothing
since Brown has altered that conclusion. Indeed, McCullen
noted that such goals reflect “undeniably significant
interests,” 134 S. Ct. at 2541, and the Plaintiffs in the present
case do not dispute the significance of the City’s interests.
Nevertheless, the Ordinance must still be narrowly
tailored to serve those interests. The District Court, applying
intermediate scrutiny (without the benefit of Reed),
essentially concluded that its analysis was controlled by our
narrow-tailoring holding in Brown. The Court reasoned that
McCullen had not “explicitly overrule[d] Hill or articulate[d]
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a deviation from the standard outlined in that case.” (App. at
26a.) In the absence of a clear break from precedent, the
District Court concluded that it was bound by our prior
analysis. In the District Court’s view, McCullen also did not
represent a binding application of the intermediate scrutiny
standard because that case involved a thirty-five foot buffer
zone and thus imposed a greater “degree of burden” on
speech than the fifteen-foot zone in Pittsburgh. (App. at 31a.)
Of course, in a mathematical sense the degree of
infringement on the Plaintiffs’ speech here is less than that
imposed on the petitioners in McCullen, fifteen feet being less
than thirty-five. But more than math is involved, and, even at
fifteen feet, Pittsburgh’s buffer zone raises serious questions
under the First Amendment. None of the four prior cases
assessing buffer zones turned solely on the size of the zones.
What matters is the burden on speech that such zones impose,
of which size is one but only one feature. Indeed, smaller
buffer zones are not always better: McCullen struck down a
thirty-five foot zone even though Madsen had previously
upheld a slightly larger zone. McCullen never referenced the
size of the approved zone in Madsen or that the
Massachusetts zones were actually smaller. Those cases
turned on their distinct factual records, not a simple
difference in real estate. McCullen emphasized the “serious
burdens” that the law imposed on speech by “compromis[ing]
petitioners’ ability to initiate the close, personal conversations
that they view as essential to ‘sidewalk counseling.’” 134 S.
Ct. at 2535. Any difference between the burden on speech in
McCullen and that here is a matter of degree rather than
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kind.15 Thus, the size of the zone at issue here is not
dispositive, and we must look more broadly at the allegations
of the Complaint.
According to those allegations, Pittsburgh’s buffer
zone Ordinance “prohibits Plaintiffs and others from
15

We agree with the observation of our concurring
colleague that the degree of burden on speech here is less than
that in McCullen, because the zones in Massachusetts were
larger, applied state-wide, and limited any entry into the
prohibited areas. But the protracted discussion undertaken by
the concurrence in an effort to contrast McCullen with this
case is unnecessary, since the differences do not change the
applicable analysis under intermediate scrutiny. As far as we
can tell, the concurrence does not contend that those
differences somehow save the Ordinance at issue here from
intermediate scrutiny or subject it to a lesser level of review.
In fact, our colleague says that he “cannot conclude, on the
basis of the allegations in the Complaint, that the Pittsburgh
buffer zones operate so differently from the Massachusetts
zones that Plaintiffs cannot advance past the pleading stage.”
(Concurrence at 25.) Because we agree with that statement,
we see little point in contrasting the two laws in lengthy dicta.
Any law that imposes a similar burden as that in McCullen –
foreclosing speech about an important subject in a
quintessential public forum “without seriously addressing the
problem through alternatives that leave the forum open for its
time-honored purposes,” 134 S. Ct. at 2541 – is subject to the
same narrow tailoring analysis as the Supreme Court
employed in that opinion. The concurrence does not deny
that Pittsburgh’s Ordinance is such a law. We are simply
following where McCullen has led.
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effectively reaching their intended audience.” (App. at 56a.)
The Complaint further alleges that “[t]he zones created by the
Ordinance make it more difficult [for the] Plaintiffs to engage
in sidewalk counseling, prayer, advocacy, and other
expressive activities,” (App. at 60a), and that the Ordinance
“will cause conversations between the Plaintiffs and those
entering or exiting the facilities to be far less frequent and far
less successful.” (App. at 60a.) Taking those allegations as
true, the burden on the Plaintiffs’ speech is akin to that
imposed upon the petitioners in McCullen, and nothing in the
Complaint suggests otherwise.16

16

The concurrence offers some suppositions about the
possible ways the Ordinance might affect people, like
Plaintiffs, engaging in sidewalk counseling. For example, it
notes that counselors will likely be able to distinguish patients
from passersby because “[a] patient heading toward a clinic
will almost certainly have manifested her intention to enter
the clinic by the time she is 15 feet from its entrance”
(Concurrence at 19), even though the photograph of the
Planned Parenthood buffer zone provided by the City shows
that it extends to the edge of the sidewalk and into the street,
which would seemingly make it quite difficult for counselors
to make any distinction between patients walking into the
clinic and pedestrians walking by it. Despite the guesswork,
the concurrence concludes by emphasizing that, “it is not the
Court’s role on a 12(b)(6) motion to supplant the wellpleaded allegations with its own speculation, or to question
the Plaintiffs’ characterization of their experiences.”
(Concurrence at 23.) That last observation is certainly
correct, which is why we have opted not to speculate or
question the allegations of the Complaint.
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Because of the significant burden on speech that the
Ordinance allegedly imposes, the City has the same
obligation to use less restrictive alternatives to its buffer zone
as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had with respect to
the buffer zone at issue in McCullen. As stated, that
obligation requires that the government “demonstrate that
alternative measures that burden substantially less speech
would fail to achieve the government’s interests.” McCullen,
134 S. Ct. at 2540. The statement of intent of the Pittsburgh
City Council – in which the Council stated that Pittsburgh’s
police had “been consistently called upon in at least two
locations within the City to mediate the disputes …. [causing]
indefinite appropriation of policing services,” Pittsburgh Pa.,
Code § 623.01 – does not by itself satisfy the required
constitutional scrutiny of the Ordinance. Although “we must
accord a measure of deference” to the government’s
judgment, Hill, 530 U.S. at 727, as in McCullen, “it is not
enough for [the City] simply to say that other approaches
have not worked.” 134 S. Ct. at 2540. We recognize that the
City need not employ “the least restrictive or least intrusive
means of serving its interests,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, but it
must, in some meaningful way, “demonstrate that alternative
measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to
achieve the government’s interests,” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at
2540. Because the City has available to it the same range of
alternatives that McCullen identified – anti-obstruction
ordinances, criminal enforcement, and targeted injunctions –
it must justify its choice to adopt the Ordinance. To do so,
the City would have to show either that substantially lessrestrictive alternatives were tried and failed, or that the
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alternatives were closely examined and ruled out for good
reason.17

17

The concurrence repeatedly tries to downplay the
significance of McCullen – variously referring to the opinion
as
“incremental,”
“modest,”
and
“unexceptional”
(Concurrence at 4-5) – and devotes much of its energy to
narrowing that case only to its facts. It does so, presumably,
in service of a desire to avoid the import of the Supreme
Court’s decision. Consider our colleague’s reading of
McCullen: “[u]nlike the majority, I do not believe that
McCullen announces a general rule requiring the government
to affirmatively prove that less-restrictive measures would fail
to achieve its interests.” (Concurrence at 1-2.) Then try to
reconcile that with the actual language of McCullen: “To
meet the requirement of narrow tailoring, the government
must demonstrate that alternative measures that burden
substantially less speech would fail to achieve the
government’s interests, not simply that the chosen route is
easier.” 134 S. Ct. at 2540. We are more ready than our
colleague is to take the high Court at its word, and that is the
heart of our disagreement with him.
Nevertheless, he asserts that our analysis “is contrary
to McCullen and distorts First Amendment doctrine.”
(Concurrence at 7.) Far from it. We are doing nothing more
than applying McCullen according to its terms. In the
unanimous language of the Supreme Court, “it is not enough
for [the government] simply to say that other approaches have
not worked.” Id. Again, the burden is on the government to
actually demonstrate that alternative measures would fail to
meet the government’s legitimate ends. We are simply
holding the City to that standard, as was done in McCullen.
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By that statement, we do not suggest that the City must
demonstrate that it has used the least-restrictive alternative,
nor do we propose that the City demonstrate it has tried or
considered every less burdensome alternative to its
Ordinance. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 (concluding that “[t]he
The concurrence claims that we have neglected to
answer “the central constitutional question: assuming that the
proposed alternatives would burden less speech than a 15-foot
buffer zone, would they burden substantially less speech?”
(Concurrence at 14.) But McCullen answered that question
for us; it just did not provide the answer our concurring
colleague might prefer. In that opinion, the Supreme Court
laid out some of the less-burdensome alternatives to a buffer
zone law. Because the burden on Plaintiffs’ speech here is
akin to that present in McCullen, the City similarly “has
available to it a variety of approaches that appear capable of
serving its interests, without excluding individuals from areas
historically open for speech and debate.” 134 S. Ct. at 2539.
The existence of those substantially less burdensome
alternatives obligates the City to try them or consider them.
Again, that is not our requirement. It is the Supreme Court’s:
“the Commonwealth has not shown that it seriously
undertook to address the problem with less intrusive tools
readily available to it. Nor has it shown that it considered
different methods that other jurisdictions have found
effective.” Id. Our analysis here is not nearly the novelty
that the concurrence suggests. This case calls for nothing
more than a straightforward application of McCullen – the
Ordinance imposes the same kind of burden on speech, the
same less burdensome options are available, and the City has
similarly failed to try or to consider those alternatives to
justify its Ordinance.
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Court of Appeals erred in sifting through all the available or
imagined alternative means of regulating sound volume in
order to determine whether the city’s solution was the least
intrusive means of achieving the desired end” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). On the contrary, analysis under
intermediate scrutiny affords some deference to a
municipality’s judgment in adopting a content-neutral
restriction on speech.18 But the municipality may not forego
18

Despite our repeated recognition of the broad
principle of deference to legislative judgments and our
explicit assurance that legislatures need not meticulously vet
every less burdensome alternative, the concurrence
nonetheless persists in suggesting that we are somehow
saying the opposite, “eliminat[ing] much of the discretion”
given to lawmakers and “requiring governments to adopt the
least restrictive alternative.” (Concurrence at 11-12.) Both
fears are unfounded. We can only say what we have
repeatedly said elsewhere in this opinion: we are imposing
neither requirement. All we can do to allay the concurrence’s
concerns, we surmise, is to emphasize that we mean what we
say.
The concurrence similarly claims that we are
conducting an unprecedented “show us your work” review of
the underlying legislative record, “something no court has
ever required.” (Concurrence at 9.) Although we (yet again)
acknowledge the need for deference, heightened scrutiny
must mean something. It is impossible to read McCullen any
other way. That case dug into the record, discussed the
substantially less burdensome alternatives available, and
assessed the Commonwealth’s failure to use those alternatives
to address its significant interests. And that was not a novel
approach. Past intermediate scrutiny cases engage in similar
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a range of alternatives – which would burden substantially
less expression than a blanket prohibition on Plaintiffs’
speech in a historically-public forum – without a meaningful
record demonstrating that those options would fail to alleviate
the problems meant to be addressed. Properly crediting the
allegations of the Complaint, Pittsburgh has not met that
burden.
Of course, the City had no opportunity to properly
produce such evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Instead, we must accept as true at this stage of the case the
review of the legislative record. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 211 (1997) (assessing “must carry”
provision by scrutinizing the legislative record, and ultimately
asking “whether the legislative conclusion was reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence in the record before
Congress” (emphasis added)); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (examining the
legislative record supporting the City of Renton’s adoption of
its ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters within 1,000
feet of residential areas); see also United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000) (striking down
content-based restriction on speech, under strict scrutiny,
citing the “near barren legislative record relevant to th[at]
provision”). The government bears the burden to establish
the reasonable fit between the challenged law and its asserted
objective. Bd. of Trs. of State. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 480-81 (1989). That burden – and the protection of
speech that heightened judicial scrutiny is meant to ensure –
would be meaningless indeed if it did not ask the government,
at the very least, to justify its choice to prohibit speech where
substantially less burdensome alternatives are available.
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Complaint’s allegation that “no specific instances of
obstructive conduct outside of hospitals or health care
facilities in the City of Pittsburgh … provide support for the
law … .” (App. at 56a.)19 The Plaintiffs further claim that
“[n]o speech activities on the public sidewalks and ways
outside the Liberty Avenue Planned Parenthood in recent
years have caused a problem preventing access to its
entrances.” (App. at 57a.) Again, these assertions must be
credited at this stage. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).
McCullen required the sovereign to justify its
regulation of political speech by describing the efforts it had
made to address the government interests at stake by
substantially less-restrictive methods or by showing that it
seriously considered and reasonably rejected “different
methods that other jurisdictions have found effective.” 134 S.
Ct. at 2539. Such proof can only be considered, however,
after a fair opportunity for discovery and the production of
evidence. Indeed, when a complaint states a plausible First
Amendment claim of the type advanced here and
substantially less burdensome alternatives appear to have
been available to the city or state, the city or state will rarely

One might argue that the qualifying phrase “provide
support for the law” makes that allegation primarily a legal
rather than a factual contention. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 21011 (holding that a court presented with a motion to dismiss
“may disregard any legal conclusions” set out in the
complaint).
Viewing it generously for the Plaintiffs,
however, we will take it to mean that no meaningful
obstruction has occurred.
19
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be able to satisfy narrow tailoring at the pleading stage.20 At
this early point in the present case, without such proof, the
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims cannot be dismissed. We
instead must credit the allegations of the Complaint, which
plausibly state a claim that the City’s Ordinance “burden[s]
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government’s legitimate interests.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at
2535 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The City contends, consistent with the District Court’s
opinion, that McCullen did not alter the narrow-tailoring
analysis to the degree necessary to change the conclusion we
reached in Brown. But McCullen employs a level of rigor
that Brown did not approach. In fact, Brown engaged in no
20

Although this is not such a case, there may be cases
in which it is clear – before any evidence is produced
regarding the government’s history of attempting and
considering alternatives – that the chosen regulation is
reasonably narrowly tailored under intermediate scrutiny. For
example, were one to challenge the hypothetical de minimis
sound amplification law posited by the concurrence, that
regulation would likely be viewed as narrowly tailored, even
at the pleading stage. With such a slight burden on speech,
any challengers would struggle to show that “alternative
measures [would] burden substantially less speech.”
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2540 (emphasis added).
We also note that our emphasis on the need for the
development of a factual record arises not only from the
general principle that a court should have a sufficient basis to
support its legal conclusions but more particularly from the
Supreme Court’s instruction in McCullen on the importance
of a factual record in considering the constitutionality of such
buffer zone laws.
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narrow-tailoring analysis of its own. It instead incorporated
the analyses of Madsen and Schenck by reference and
concluded that Pittsburgh’s buffer zone was “a fortiori
constitutionally valid” in light of those past cases. Brown,
586 F.3d at 276. At the very least, McCullen has called that
approach into question, clarifying that the particular facts of
each case must be examined.21 No buffer zone can be upheld
a fortiori simply because a similar one was deemed
constitutional, since the background facts associated with the
creation and enforcement of a zone cannot be assumed to be
identical with those of an earlier case, even if the ordinances
in the two cases happened to be the same.
McCullen made this evident when it struck down a
smaller buffer zone than that which was upheld in Madsen.
Also, both Madsen and Schenck involved plaintiff-specific
injunctions, which is one of the less-restrictive alternatives
identified by McCullen that a sovereign should utilize before
turning to “broad, prophylactic measures” like generallyapplicable buffer zones that “unnecessarily sweep[] in
innocent individuals and their speech.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct.
at 2538. And it may be noteworthy that Brown considered its
narrow-tailoring conclusion to be “bolstered” by the First
Circuit’s opinion in McCullen, which was the very decision
later reversed by the Supreme Court. Brown, 586 F.3d at 276.

In this way, we entirely agree with the concurrence’s
observation that McCullen requires that courts may no longer
hold “that a speech regulation is constitutional if it is facially
similar to a restriction upheld in a prior Supreme Court case.”
(Concurrence at 5.)
21
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McCullen represents an important clarification of the
rigorous and fact-intensive nature of intermediate scrutiny’s
narrow-tailoring analysis, and the decision is sufficient to call
into question our conclusion in Brown. See In re Krebs, 527
F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A panel of this Court may
reevaluate the holding of a prior panel which conflicts with
intervening Supreme Court precedent.”).
The recent
instruction from McCullen and the factual allegations of the
Complaint combine to require that we vacate the District
Court’s grant of the City’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’
free speech claims. Because the Plaintiffs’ Complaint should
not have been dismissed, the District Court’s improper
consideration of materials beyond the pleadings to convert the
motion to one for summary judgment cannot be treated as
harmless error.
2.

Free Press Claim

The Plaintiffs also raise a claim under the Freedom of
the Press Clause of the First Amendment, because “the
Ordinance prohibits them from leafleting on public
sidewalks.” (Opening Br. at 37.) The District Court did not
directly address that aspect of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
claim, instead dismissing the facial challenge in its entirety.
On appeal, the City argues that the free press claim “properly
fell along with the rest of the First Amendment claim under
the district court’s analysis.” (Appellee’s Br. at 42 n.4.)
The City’s contention is correct in the abstract. Had
the District Court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs’ free
speech claim, it would also have been proper to dismiss their
free press claim, because the Plaintiffs’ free press claim is, in
this context, properly considered a subset of their broader free
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speech claim, given that the Freedom of the Press Clause and
the Free Speech Clause both protect leafleting from
government interference. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga.,
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of the press is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily
embraces pamphlets and leaflets.”); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“[T]he speech
in which Mrs. McIntyre engaged – handing out leaflets in the
advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint – is the
essence of First Amendment expression.”).
But as the claims could properly fall together, the
converse is also true here: resuscitation of the broader free
speech claim requires us to vacate the dismissal of the free
press claim. In light of the burden the Ordinance places on
speech, the City’s inability to show at the motion to dismiss
stage that substantially less burdensome alternatives would
fail to achieve its interests dooms its broad prohibition on all
of the Plaintiffs’ expressive activities, including the
prohibition on leafleting.
3.

Overbreadth Claim

The Plaintiffs next contend that the Ordinance violates
the First Amendment by imposing an unconstitutionally
overbroad restriction on speech “because it authorizes the
creation of zones at non-abortion locations where the City
does not even claim there has been a justification for banning
speech.” (Opening Br. at 38.) The City responds – just as the
District Court did in dismissing this claim – that their
argument is “foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Brown.”
(Answering Br. at 42.) In Brown, we rejected the plaintiff’s
facial overbreadth challenge because such a claim was
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undercut by Hill. 586 F.3d at 282-83 n.21. Hill involved a
floating bubble zone that applied, like Pittsburgh’s Ordinance,
to “any health care facility.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 707. Despite
that, the Supreme Court upheld the statute against a facial
challenge to its overbreadth. Id. at 730-32. “The fact that the
coverage of a statute is broader than the specific concern that
led to its enactment is of no constitutional significance,” the
Court noted. Id. at 730-31. In fact, said the Court, “the
comprehensiveness of the statute is a virtue, not a vice,
because it is evidence against there being a discriminatory
governmental motive.” Id. at 731.
Like the statute at issue in Hill, a buffer zone under the
Ordinance can be established at any “hospital, medical office
or clinic … .” (App. at 150a.) But the Plaintiffs’ Complaint
alleges that the Ordinance “is only enforced outside of health
care facilities which provide abortions” (App. at 56a); the
entirety of the discussion of the Ordinance’s enforcement in
the Complaint relates to a single Planned Parenthood location.
The McCullen Court did address the breadth of the
Massachusetts buffer zone statute, but it did so only in the
context of its free speech analysis and discussion of the
disconnect between the government interests at stake and the
means through which it sought to vindicate those interests.
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539 (noting that interests pertaining
“mainly to one place at one time: the Boston Planned
Parenthood clinic on Saturday mornings” do not require
“creating 35-foot buffer zones at every clinic across the
Commonwealth”). Given its holding striking down the law,
McCullen explicitly did not reach the petitioners’ overbreadth
challenge. Id. at 2540 n.9.
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We think it unwise for us to assess the proper scope of
the City’s Ordinance without there first being a resolution of
the merits of the Plaintiffs’ free speech claim. It is true that
the breadth of the challenged law plays a role in the narrowtailoring analysis of the Plaintiffs’ free speech claim. See
Brown, 586 F.3d at 273 n.10 (“What the petitioners classified
as an ‘overbreadth’ problem, in other words, was better
understood analytically as a concern to be addressed within
the framework of … [a] narrow-tailoring test.”); McCullen,
134 S. Ct. at 2539 (comparing breadth of statute against
government interest in striking down statute on narrowtailoring grounds). But we cannot adequately assess the
overbreadth argument absent a well-supported conclusion
regarding the proper scope of the Ordinance. “[A] law may
be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473
(internal quotation marks omitted). Without the developed
factual record that McCullen requires, we do not know the
“legitimate sweep” of the buffer zone law, and thus whether it
substantially exceeds that sweep. As with the Plaintiffs’ other
First Amendment claims, it is premature to dismiss their
overbreadth challenge. Accordingly, we will reverse the
District Court’s dismissal of the overbreadth claim.
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4.

Due Process Claim

Finally, the Plaintiffs maintain that the Ordinance
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it “vests unbridled discretion in the City
to create buffer zones outside of any hospital or health care
facility in the City of Pittsburgh.” (Opening Br. at 42.) The
District Court dismissed that claim because the substance of
the claim is “more appropriately characterized as violations
under the First Amendment.” (App. at 39a.)
The District Court properly pointed out that all of the
precedents cited by the Plaintiffs involved First Amendment
claims. “Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against a particular
sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the
guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Any
concerns about the exercise of discretion vested in City
officials can be addressed in an as-applied challenge to the
Ordinance’s enforcement under the First Amendment.22 We
thus agree with the District Court that “[t]he First
Amendment is the proper constitutional home for Plaintiffs’
In granting the parties’ motion to voluntarily dismiss
with prejudice the as-applied challenges, the District Court’s
order noted: “The parties specify that dismissal is with
prejudice to these two existing matters, but the prejudice does
not prevent assertion of such claims against future
applications of the ordinance by the City.” (District Court
Docket, Doc. 31.)
22
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freedom of speech and press claims … .” (App. at 37a.)
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of
the Plaintiffs’ Due Process claim.23
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District
Court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims
and affirm the dismissal of their Due Process claim. Again,
nothing in this opinion should be construed as a conclusion
about the ultimate merits of the claims or defenses advanced
by the parties. There are not enough facts in the record for us
to make any such comment, even were we so inclined. That
is the problem. We reverse so that the Plaintiffs’ claims may
be aired and assessed by the standard that McCullen now
requires.

23

Although the Plaintiffs also raised a procedural due
process claim, which the District Court dismissed, they have
made no argument before us concerning that claim.
Accordingly, any argument supporting the procedural due
process claim is waived. See United States v. Pelullo, 399
F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an
appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening
brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”).
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the majority that the allegations in the
Complaint, taken as true, establish that Pittsburgh’s
Ordinance restricting certain speech within 15 feet of
designated health care facilities violates the intermediatescrutiny standard for time, place, and manner regulations. I
disagree, however, with the majority’s reasoning in support of
that result. In particular, I disagree with its conclusion that
the Supreme Court’s decision in McCullen v. Coakley1
requires governments that place “significant” burdens on
speech to prove either that less speech-restrictive measures
have failed or that alternative measures were “seriously”
considered and “reasonably” rejected. That interpretation
distorts narrow-tailoring doctrine by eliminating the
government’s latitude to adopt regulations that are not “the
least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the
government’s interests.”2 Nothing in McCullen or the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence requires us
to apply such a rule. Accordingly, as to Plaintiffs’ freespeech claim, I concur only in the judgment.3
I.
My disagreement with the majority stems entirely from
our differing interpretations of McCullen. Unlike the
majority, I do not believe that McCullen announces a general
1

134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).

2

Id. at 2535 (internal quotation marks omitted).

I agree with the majority’s disposition of Plaintiffs’ free
press, overbreadth, and due process claims.
3

1

rule requiring the government to affirmatively prove that lessrestrictive measures would fail to achieve its interests. Before
addressing the source of this disagreement, therefore, I think
it is useful to review McCullen and to situate it among the
Supreme Court’s narrow-tailoring and abortion-protest
precedents.
McCullen is, first and foremost, a straightforward
application of the Ward narrow-tailoring standard for time,
place, and manner regulations. Such regulations “must not
‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further
the government’s legitimate interests.’”4 But the regulation
“‘need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’
serving the government’s interests.”5 The ultimate question is
whether the government has achieved an appropriate “balance
between the affected speech and the governmental interests
that the ordinance purports to serve.”6
McCullen was a case of extreme imbalance—so much
so that the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the
challenged statute failed narrow tailoring. The Massachusetts
law at issue imposed remarkably onerous burdens on
speakers, prohibiting all speech by all non-exempt persons in
a 35-foot section of the public way at all abortion clinics in
the entire state of Massachusetts.7 As the Supreme Court
4

McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
5

Id. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798).

6

Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002).
7

McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2526.

2

recognized, “closing a substantial portion of a traditional
public forum to all speakers” is an “extreme step.”8
Likewise, “categorically exclud[ing] non-exempt individuals”
from particular zones was certain to “unnecessarily sweep in
innocent individuals and their speech.”9 And the risks were
not simply hypothetical. Based on the record, the Court
concluded that the Massachusetts buffer zones “impose[d]
serious burdens on petitioners’ speech” and “carve[d] out a
significant portion of the adjacent public sidewalks, pushing
petitioners well back from the clinics’ entrances and
driveways.”10
The Massachusetts law also departed significantly
from the regulations upheld in the Supreme Court’s prior
abortion-protest cases. Unlike the injunctions in Madsen v.
Women’s Health Center, Inc.11 and Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of Western N.Y.,12 which were targeted at specific
defendants in specific locations, the Massachusetts law
prohibited speech by all persons at all abortion clinics
throughout the state. Unlike the so-called “bubble zones” in
Hill v. Colorado,13 the Massachusetts law forbade speakers
from even standing in the buffer zone, thereby foreclosing
leafletting or consensual conversations within the zone. And

8

Id. at 2541 (emphasis added).

9

Id. at 2538.

10

Id. at 2537-38 (emphasis added).

11

512 U.S. 753 (1994).

12

519 U.S. 357 (1997).

13

530 U.S. 703 (2000).

3

it did so by cordoning off an entire portion of the public
forum to all speakers and all messages.
The fact that the Massachusetts law imposed “truly
exceptional” burdens on speakers also naturally suggested
that Massachusetts had “too readily forgone options that
could serve its interests just as well.”14 The Court proposed a
number of less-intrusive alternatives: access problems could
be addressed through a law that prohibited deliberate
obstruction of clinic entrances; harassment could be
addressed by an ordinance like the one adopted in New York
City that makes it a crime “to follow and harass another
person within 15 feet of the premises of a reproductive health
care facility”; and targeted injunctions could be used against
particularly troublesome individuals.15
But because
Massachusetts could not identify a single prosecution brought
under the other laws at its disposal, it could not show “that it
seriously undertook to address the problem with less intrusive
tools readily available to it.”16 The Court concluded that
Massachusetts could not enact such an extreme speech
prohibition
without
offering
a
correspondingly
comprehensive justification.
McCullen, fairly read, represents an incremental
advance in narrow-tailoring doctrine. As the majority
implicitly recognizes, McCullen did not alter the substantive
standard for time, place, and manner restrictions. What it did,
rather, is direct courts toward a more nuanced mode of
14

McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537.

15

Id. at 2537-39.

16

Id. at 2539.

4

narrow-tailoring analysis. It is no longer enough to say, as we
did in Brown v. City of Pittsburgh,17 that a speech regulation
is constitutional if it is facially similar to a restriction upheld
in a prior Supreme Court case. Instead, courts must scrutinize
the practical operation of the regulation at issue, including its
effects on particular types of messaging (e.g., sidewalk
counseling and handbilling), the degree to which it privileges
ease of enforcement rather than legitimate public access
interests, and, in appropriate cases, the availability of less
burdensome alternatives.
Such scrutiny is especially
warranted where, as in McCullen, the government enacts a
blanket prohibition to address a localized problem.
These are modest, commonsense propositions.
Notably, not a single Supreme Court justice considered
McCullen’s narrow-tailoring analysis worthy of dissent or
separate comment—a remarkable consensus in a case pitting
abortion-access interests against the right to free speech. That
unanimity is not surprising in light of the extreme facts
presented and the straightforward doctrinal analysis required.
McCullen, when read against its precedents, is best
understood as a boundary-setting exercise—a corrective but
ultimately unexceptional exposition of narrow-tailoring
doctrine.
II.
The majority reads McCullen differently. McCullen, it
says, announces a new rule: henceforth, the government must
justify any law that places a “significant” burden on speech
“by describing the efforts it ha[s] made to address the
government interests at stake by substantially less-restrictive
17

586 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2009).

5

methods or by showing that it seriously considered and
reasonably rejected ‘different methods that other jurisdictions
have found effective.’”18 Applying the rule to this case, the
majority states that the City “has the same obligation to use
less restrictive alternatives . . . as the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts had with respect to the buffer zone at issue in
McCullen.”19 Therefore, regardless of any differences in size
and prohibited conduct between the Massachusetts buffer
zones and the City’s buffer zones, the Ordinance is flatly
unconstitutional unless the City can “show either that
18

Maj. Op. 27, 31 (quoting McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539.)
As the majority acknowledges, the rule it announces today
applies only to laws, like the buffer zone in McCullen, that
place a “significant burden on speech.” Id. 27. The rule does
not apply in the mine run of cases involving ordinary or de
minimis time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. 32 n.20.
An example may illustrate the distinction. Imagine
that a beach town adopts a de minimis time, place and manner
restriction: no person may use an electronic soundamplification device on the beach between the hours of 1:00
a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Under today’s decision, this law should
be upheld simply because it hardly burdens any speech, and
certainly does not burden more speech than necessary to
achieve the government’s interests. The town government
need not prove either that it attempted or that it seriously
considered and reasonably rejected less restrictive
alternatives, such as a law saying no amplification devices
between 2:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., or a law saying no
amplification devices within 100 feet of a beachfront
residence, or a law saying no amplifiers above 50 watts.
19

Maj. Op. 27.

6

substantially less-restrictive alternatives were tried and failed,
or that the alternatives were closely examined and ruled out
for good reason.”20 The majority acknowledges that under
this rule, “dismissal of claims challenging ordinances like the
one at issue here will rarely, if ever, be appropriate at the
pleading stage.”21 But “without such proof, the Plaintiffs’
First Amendment claims cannot be dismissed.”22
I believe that the majority’s new “proof of prior
efforts” rule is contrary to McCullen and distorts First
Amendment doctrine. It is, of course, indisputably true that
under McCullen, the government cannot take “the extreme
step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public
forum to all speakers” without “seriously addressing the
problem through alternatives that leave the forum open for its
time-honored purposes.”23 But that is not the same thing as
saying that every “significant” time, place, and manner law—
or even every buffer zone—must be supported by evidence
that the government vetted less-restrictive alternatives prior to
the law’s adoption, regardless of the burden the law actually
places on speech. Such a rule stretches McCullen too far,
risks untoward results, and disregards McCullen’s express
statement that a regulation—even one that places
“significant” burdens on speech—need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the
government’s interests.

20

Maj. Op. 28.

21

Maj. Op. 4.

22

Maj. Op. 32.

23

McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2541 (emphasis added).

7

Contrary to the majority’s reading, McCullen’s
invocation of less-restrictive alternatives did not break new
ground in First Amendment doctrine. The burden is always
on the government to prove that a time, place, or manner
restriction does not “burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”24
A necessary part of that inquiry is whether there are lessrestrictive alternatives that could meet the government’s
interests.25 It is therefore unexceptional to say, as the Court
did in McCullen, that “the government must demonstrate that
alternative measures that burden substantially less speech
would fail to achieve the government’s interests.”26 If the
government’s needs could be met by alternatives that “burden
substantially less speech,” then the challenged regulation ipso
facto “burdens substantially more speech than is necessary.”
But the adverb supplies the test: the operative question, in this
case and others, is whether the proposed alternatives would
burden substantially less speech while still furthering the
government’s interests. In practice, this means that a city
24

Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.

25

See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 529
(1996) (“The availability of less burdensome alternatives to
reach the stated goal signals that the fit between the
legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends may be too imprecise to withstand First Amendment
scrutiny.” (O’Connor, J. concurring)).
26

134 S. Ct. at 2540. It also seems implausible that the
Supreme Court would choose to announce a new, standalone
First Amendment tailoring rule in the middle of a paragraph
at the end of an opinion section devoted to rejecting a party’s
arguments.

8

faced with a range of possible solutions to a public nuisance
is free to reject less-burdensome options, so long as it does
not reject viable options that would burden substantially less
speech.
The majority opinion grafts an additional requirement
onto the “substantially more speech than necessary” test: a
municipality must now also prove that, before adopting a
regulation that “significantly” burdens speech, it either
attempted or “seriously considered” and “reasonably
rejected” less-intrusive alternatives.
This rule improperly
elevates one element of the narrow-tailoring inquiry—the
availability of less-burdensome alternatives—into a
standalone rule of constitutionality. And it does so by
converting our inquiry from an after-the-fact assessment of
the burdens and benefits of a regulation (what McCullen
actually requires) into a review of the sufficiency of the
underlying legislative record (something no court has ever
required). I see no reason why we should begin conducting
judicial audits of the legislative rulemaking process.27 As
Note the fundamental oddity of today’s rule, which
essentially requires legislatures to “show us their work” and
prove that they took certain considerations into account
during the rulemaking process. We frequently assess speech
statutes by asking what problem the statute was meant to
solve and how well it does so in practice. And as the majority
notes, we will sometimes review the legislative record when
deference requires us to assess whether Congress acted
reasonably, see Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
195-96 (1997), or when determining whether the
government’s justification for a regulation is purely
speculative, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S.
27

9

41, 50-52 (1986). But I am unaware of any First Amendment
context in which we affirmatively require a legislative body
to produce a record of its underlying decisionmaking
processes, and then base our constitutional determination on
whether the legislature crossed off each item on a prescribed
factfinding checklist before it enacted the rule in question.
Intermediate scrutiny requires us to defer to a legislature’s
judgments, not dictate its rulemaking procedures. See Turner
Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 218 (“It is well established a
regulation’s validity does not turn on a judge’s agreement
with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most
appropriate method for promoting significant government
interests.”) (internal quotation omitted); City of Renton, 475
U.S. at 50-52 (cities enacting time, place, and manner
regulations need not produce evidence specifically relating to
the city’s problems or needs and may instead rely on the
experiences of other cities).
The novelty of this type of constitutional review raises
a variety of practical questions, none of which are answered
in the majority opinion. For starters: How can a government
ever determine, prior to legislating, which alternatives it must
“seriously consider”?
What constitutes a “reasoned”
rejection? When a government legislates to address a new
problem (i.e., in the absence of practical enforcement
experience), what weight should courts give to predictive
judgments about the drawbacks or benefits of a rejected
proposal?
How, if at all, does the “seriously
considered/reasonably rejected” standard incorporate the
Supreme Court’s instruction in Hill, 530 U.S. at 727, that we
must “accord a measure of deference” to the legislature’s
judgment regarding how best to accommodate competing
interests? Can a government “reasonably reject” a viable

10

McCullen makes clear, the constitutionality of a speech
regulation depends on its scope and its effects, not on whether
whether the legislative body satisfied some indeterminate set
of preconditions before it began drafting.
The Supreme
Court’s time, place, and manner jurisprudence is concerned
with outcomes rather than procedure.
By extending judicial scrutiny to the legislative
process itself, the majority’s new tailoring standard
improperly eliminates much of the discretion that Ward and
McCullen confer on municipal decisionmakers.28 Ward tells
municipalities that they need not entertain every conceivable
less-intrusive alternative before adopting a speech law,
because hypothetical regulations that would not burden
substantially less speech than the chosen option are irrelevant

alternative that would burden substantially less speech than
the chosen option?
The majority leaves these questions to future courts.
In light of the novelty of the required inquiry and the fact that
most (if not all) municipal time, place, and manner
restrictions are not supported by the type of factual record
today’s decision requires, it is worth reemphasizing that the
majority’s rule only applies to laws that place significant
burdens on speech. In the vast majority of cases, litigants and
District Courts need not consult legislative history or grapple
with the questions raised here.
28

See also Hill, 530 U.S. at 727 (courts evaluating whether a
speech restriction “is the best possible accommodation of the
competing interests at stake” must “accord a measure of
deference” to the legislature’s judgment).

11

to the First Amendment calculus.29 Today’s opinion, by
contrast, tells municipalities not only that they must entertain
such alternatives, but that they must also prepare a record
demonstrating that they “seriously considered” and
“reasonably rejected” such alternatives during the rulemaking
process. Similarly, Ward directs courts not to “sift[ ] through
all the available or imagined alternative means of regulating”
a given activity to “determine whether the city’s solution was
‘the least intrusive means’ of achieving the desired end.”30
Today’s decision requires courts to sift through the available
or imagined alternatives to a challenged regulation and
determine whether the city “reasonably rejected” each one.
This approach would be understandable if McCullen had
disavowed or limited Ward. But McCullen expressly follows
Ward and preserves government discretion by reaffirming
that a time, place, and manner regulation “‘need not be the
least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the
government’s interests.”31 Here, a rule that strikes down
speech laws whenever the government cannot justify the nonadoption of less-restrictive alternatives treads impermissibly
close to a rule requiring governments to adopt the least
restrictive alternative.

See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797 (“[R]estrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid ‘simply
because there is some imaginable alternative that might be
less burdensome on speech.’”) (quoting United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
29

30

Ward, 491 U.S. at 797.

31

McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at
798).
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Today’s opinion also introduces a fundamental
inconsistency into our narrow-tailoring doctrine. McCullen
and its predecessors establish that any time, place and manner
regulation is constitutional so long as it does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve the
government’s aims. The majority’s new rule bypasses this
inquiry in cases of “significant” burden and instead mandates
a finding of unconstitutionality whenever the government
cannot prove that it tried, properly considered, or reasonably
rejected less-restrictive alternatives. This means that even if a
regulation objectively does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary, it will still be unconstitutional if the
government cannot prove that it engaged in the prescribed
factfinding. But this is not how narrow tailoring works.
Under McCullen and its predecessors, a regulation can be
perfectly constitutional even if the government has no record
of how it arrived at its rulemaking, so long as the regulation
does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
serve a legitimate government interest.32 The lack of such a
record may be relevant to the narrow-tailoring analysis, for all
the reasons explained in McCullen—but it is not dispositive.
This case illustrates my concern. The majority holds
that the plaintiffs have successfully pleaded a constitutional
violation because (1) the City has available to it lessrestrictive alternatives such as “anti-obstruction ordinances,
criminal enforcement, and targeted injunctions,” and (2) the
City has failed to try such measures or to justify its decision
32

The inverse also holds true: if a law burdens substantially
more speech than necessary to achieve the government’s
interests, it should be declared unconstitutional regardless of
the government’s proffered justification.

13

not to adopt them.33 But this approach fails to address the
central constitutional question: assuming that the proposed
alternatives would burden less speech than a 15-foot buffer
zone, would they burden substantially less speech?34 Or do
they fall within the range of slightly less burdensome
restrictions that the City remains free to reject out of hand
because it is not obligated to choose the least restrictive
alternative? To answer, we would need to assess the actual
burden imposed by the Ordinance; how much less
burdensome the proposed alternatives would be; and how
likely it is that the proposed alternatives would meet the
City’s legitimate interests. The majority’s per se proof rule
skips over this analysis and proceeds straight to the outcome.
To the extent the majority reads McCullen as adopting
a special rule for buffer zones, that distinction does not appear
on the face of the McCullen opinion or follow naturally from
the Supreme Court’s reasoning. As the majority recognizes
elsewhere, what McCullen actually demands is a nuanced
tailoring analysis that accounts for context and practical
consequences—not a rigid new tier of scrutiny for statutes
that create physical zones of exclusion. After all, every time
the government builds a fountain in a public park or installs a
planter on the sidewalk, it is technically “carving out” a piece
33

Maj. Op. 28.

34

As explained in Section III, infra, the Pittsburgh buffer
zone at issue here burdens far less speech than the
Massachusetts zone in McCullen. Therefore, we cannot
simply assume that the alternative measures discussed in the
McCullen opinion would also burden substantially less speech
than the Pittsburgh Ordinance.
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of the public forum and preventing its use as a site for
expression. We may safely assume that the Supreme Court
did not intend such projects to be unconstitutional unless a
city can prove that smaller fountains and planters cannot meet
the city’s beautification needs. But I am also confident that
the McCullen Court did not intend to require courts to
develop a special body of jurisprudence to deal with such
questions.
In short, nothing in McCullen or its antecedents
requires courts to strike down a time, place, and manner
restriction whenever the government cannot prove that it tried
or seriously considered less intrusive measures. Narrow
tailoring permits a fit between the legislature’s goal and
method “that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one
whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”35
Plaintiffs will always be able to conceive and plead less
burdensome alternatives to a given regulation. Forcing the
government to identify those alternatives and affirmatively
disprove their viability prior to legislating would convert
narrow tailoring from a “reasonable fit” requirement to a
“perfect fit” requirement.
The availability of lessburdensome alternatives is relevant only to the extent it
informs the ultimate question: whether the regulation
“‘burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government’s legitimate interests.’”36
That
35

Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989).
36

McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (emphasis added) (quoting
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
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standard, rather than the majority’s inflexible “proof of prior
efforts” rule, should govern the outcome of this case.
III.
Plaintiffs’ invocation of less-intrusive alternatives
therefore does not resolve this case. We still must ask: under
the fact-specific tailoring analysis required by McCullen, does
the Pittsburgh Ordinance burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the City’s legitimate interests in
protecting women’s access to pregnancy-related services,
ensuring public safety, and promoting the free flow of traffic?
The majority says “yes,” in part because it views the burdens
imposed by the Ordinance as functionally indistinguishable
from the burdens imposed by the Massachusetts law in
McCullen. I am less certain. While I ultimately agree that
the Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a First Amendment
violation, there are numerous distinctions between the buffer
zones in McCullen and the buffer zones in this case. These
distinctions demonstrate why this case cannot be decided
simply by citing the prospect of less-burdensome alternatives.
Size of the Zones. The most obvious difference
between the Pittsburgh buffer zones and the McCullen buffer
zones is their size. The radius of the Pittsburgh buffer is less
than half the radius of the Massachusetts buffer, and creates a
zone whose total area is less than one-fifth the area of the
Massachusetts zone. (Put differently, the Massachusetts zone
was 2.3 times longer, and its total area was 5.4 times larger.)
The Pittsburgh Ordinance therefore carves out a substantially
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smaller piece of the public forum.37 I agree with the majority
that size alone is not dispositive, and that what ultimately
matters is “the burden on speech that such zones impose.”38
But when the regulation in question enforces physical
distances between speakers and listeners, the distance is the
burden. And there is reason to think that the difference in
size between the Massachusetts and Pittsburgh zones is
constitutionally significant.
The first point to bear in mind is that the buffer zone
perimeter is not an impermeable barrier that prevents the
transmission of Plaintiffs’ message to individuals within the
zone. Plaintiffs can speak to women who are inside the zone
or hand leaflets to them if they are within arm’s reach.
Plaintiffs can begin a conversation with a woman outside the
zone and continue it as the woman enters the zone, or can
initiate a conversation with a woman while she is in the zone
and continue it as she exits.
The second, closely related point is that, because the
zone is situated around a point of ingress and egress, potential
listeners will be moving through the zone rather than standing
in a fixed location beyond earshot. And the 15-foot buffer
does not require Plaintiffs to remain 15 feet away from
patients—just 15 feet away from the clinic doors. Practically
37

Cf. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (the Massachusetts zones
“carve out a significant portion of the adjacent public
sidewalks); id. at 2541 (Massachusetts has taken “the extreme
step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public
forum to all speakers”).
38

Maj. Op. 26.
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speaking, then, a woman entering the clinic will at first be
quite close to the speaker and then only gradually move 15
feet away, while a woman exiting the clinic will begin 15 feet
away but then move into close proximity.
Therefore, a buffer zone around clinic entrances does
not really exclude speech throughout a physical zone, but
rather creates a temporal window during which listeners are
unable or less likely to receive the speaker’s message. The
length of that window defines the actual speech burden
imposed by the buffer regulation. Here, the window seems
short. With respect to oral communication, the Supreme
Court in Hill concluded that a rule prohibiting speakers from
entering within eight feet of a listener still “allows the speaker
to communicate at a normal conversational distance.”39
Accepting this premise, the Ordinance creates two relevant
zones: an eight-foot zone in which listeners can
presumptively be reached through Plaintiffs’ particular brand
of conversational messaging, and a seven-foot zone in which
listeners cannot be reached (or only reached with difficulty).
Women entering or leaving a clinic will likely traverse this
seven-foot “no-speech” zone in three or four steps—a matter
of seconds. The deprivation of those few seconds of
messaging seems like a minimal burden on Plaintiffs’ speech.
It also seems like a much lesser burden than the one
imposed by the Massachusetts buffer zone, which created a
27-foot “no-speech” zone in which women presumably could
not be reached. And while it may be debatable whether
Plaintiffs would truly be unable to communicate with a
woman in the inner seven-foot zone around Pittsburgh clinics,
39
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it is much more likely that they would have been completely
unable to communicate with a woman who was well within
the 27-foot zone in McCullen. By the same token, if women
traversing the Pittsburgh buffer zone largely remain within
earshot of Plaintiffs’ message, that would also alleviate the
concern raised in McCullen that “[i]f all that the women can
see and hear are vociferous opponents of abortion, then the
buffer zones have effectively stifled [sidewalk counselors’]
message.”40
Plaintiffs, following the Supreme Court’s lead in
McCullen, also allege that the Ordinance makes it more
difficult for them to distinguish patients from passersby and
initiate conversations before they enter the buffer zone. I
have not found support for the implicit premise that speakers
have a First Amendment right to identify preferred listeners.
Either way, here again there is a qualitative distinction
between a 35-foot buffer and a 15-foot buffer. A patient
heading toward a clinic will almost certainly have manifested
her intention to enter the clinic by the time she is 15 feet from
its entrance, but is less likely to have done so at 35 feet out.
A patient would have to be lost or particularly furtive to avoid
being noticed by counselors standing 15 feet from the clinic
doors. Thus, assuming that Plaintiffs’ ability to recognize
patients is a valid First Amendment consideration, I doubt
that the Ordinance seriously hampers that ability.
The Ordinance does, however, place a greater burden
on leafleting. Unlike the statute in Hill, the Ordinance does
not allow speakers to stand within the zone and hand out
literature to passing women, but rather forces them to do so
40
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from outside the zone. But as we noted in Brown, “[a]lthough
the buffer zone, standing alone, would require leafletters to
remain beyond arm’s reach of a medical facilities’ entrances,
they would still be able to approach individuals outside of the
15-foot radius in order to distribute their literature.”41 In Hill,
the Supreme Court “noted approvingly that the bubble zone
allowed leafletters to stand stationary in the path of oncoming
pedestrians,” which is also the case for Plaintiffs 15 feet away
from the clinic entrance.42 And because the smaller 15-foot
zone gives Plaintiffs more time to identify potential patients,
it affords greater opportunity to physically intercept listeners
and offer literature.
Scope of Prohibited Activity. The Massachusetts law
made it unlawful for anyone to “knowingly enter or remain”
within a buffer zone. The Pittsburgh Ordinance makes it
unlawful to “knowingly congregate, patrol, picket or
demonstrate” within a buffer zone. There are at least two
consequential distinctions between these prohibitions.
First, as the McCullen Court disapprovingly observed,
the Massachusetts law prohibited all speech of any kind
within the zone, from political advocacy all the way down to
cell phone conversations or casual discussions about the
weather. The Pittsburgh Ordinance, by contrast, restricts only
certain kinds of protest speech—“picketing” and
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“demonstrating.”43 To be sure, such speech is core First
Amendment speech. But it is nonetheless true that the
Ordinance’s prohibitions sweep far less widely than the
Massachusetts law, and do not prohibit innocent or casual
speech within the zone.
Second, the Ordinance, unlike the Massachusetts law,
permits protesters and counselors to move through the buffer
zone. This understanding has been confirmed by the City in a
limiting interpretation.44 The City explains in its brief that
before the December 2014 preliminary injunction hearing,
“Ms. Bruni and the other plaintiffs apparently believed the
Ordinance prohibited them from passing through the zone at
all even if they refrained from prohibited conduct while in the
zone—for example, if they were standing on one side of the
clinic’s doorway and wanted to engage someone approaching
from the other side. However, that erroneous understanding
has been clarified . . . .”45 To the extent this limitation gives
Plaintiffs greater opportunity to physically intercept patients
before they enter the zone or on their way out, it bears
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The majority is therefore incorrect to characterize the
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challenge to a state law, ‘a federal court must, of course,
consider any limiting construction that a state court or
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directly on whether the Ordinance burdens sidewalk
counseling “substantially” more than necessary.
Statutory Reach. A key failing of the Massachusetts
law was its overbreadth: while the record showed that
congestion was only a problem at one Boston clinic on
Saturday mornings, the law created permanent buffer zones at
every single clinic throughout the state. “For a problem
shown to arise only once a week in one city at one clinic,
creating 35-foot buffer zones at every clinic across the
Commonwealth is hardly a narrowly tailored solution.”46 The
Pittsburgh Ordinance, by contrast, only applies to clinics
within one city. Moreover, following the District Court’s
post-remand injunction, the City must clearly demarcate any
buffer zone prior to its enforcement.47 The Complaint only
identifies one such demarcated buffer zone, outside the
downtown Planned Parenthood Clinic.48 And because the
Ordinance only prohibits certain types of protest speech, it
does not ban speech throughout the week like the
Massachusetts law, but only at times when protest activity
actually occurs. In contrast to the Massachusetts law, the
Pittsburgh Ordinance appears tailored to address a particular
problem in a particular location at particular times.
*
*
*
Accordingly, there are strong practical and doctrinal
reasons to conclude that the City’s buffer zones are
qualitatively different from—and burden significantly less
46
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speech than—the Massachusetts buffer zones in McCullen.
There is correspondingly less reason to conclude that the
mere possibility of less-intrusive alternatives requires a
finding that the Ordinance burdens substantially more speech
than necessary.
I agree with the majority, however, that it is not the
Court’s role on a 12(b)(6) motion to supplant the wellpleaded allegations with its own speculation, or to question
the Plaintiffs’ characterization of their experiences. The
Ordinance may function in the ways I have described above;
it may not. What Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint, however,
is that the Ordinance “prohibits Plaintiffs and others from
effectively reaching their intended audience”; that the
Pittsburgh zones “make it more difficult [for the] Plaintiffs to
engage in sidewalk counseling, prayer, advocacy, and other
expressive activities”; and that the Ordinance “will cause
conversations between the Plaintiffs and those entering or
exiting the facilities to be far less frequent and far less
successful.”49 These are plausible consequences of the buffer
zone’s restrictions on sidewalk counseling activity, which,
according to Plaintiffs, can only be undertaken “through
close, caring, and personal conversations, and cannot be
conveyed through protests.”50 And while Plaintiffs may be
able to speak with women in the zone, there is no dispute that
the Ordinance categorically prohibits leafleting within a fixed
portion of a public forum.51
49
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The Complaint also includes allegations suggesting
that the Ordinance sweeps more broadly than necessary to
meet the City’s interests. As in McCullen, the City’s use of a
fixed buffer zone plausibly suggests that the City adopted the
Ordinance because it would be easy to enforce, rather than
because less intrusive measures could not serve its legitimate
interests. Plaintiffs also claim that different laws targeted
only at harassing or obstructive behavior, such as the ones
discussed in McCullen, would burden less speech than the
fixed buffer zones imposed by the Ordinance. And crucially,
Plaintiffs allege that “no specific instances of obstructive
conduct outside of hospitals or health care facilities in the
City of Pittsburgh . . . provide support for the law.”52
Massachusetts law struck down in McCullen. As Hill
acknowledged and McCullen emphasized, “handing out
leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial
viewpoint is the essence of First Amendment expression; no
form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection.”
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2536. A sidewalk counselor who
stands in place offering leaflets for a patient to accept or
reject does not seem like a serious impediment to patient
access or public safety. That said, the Ordinance could
conceivably be construed to permit leafleting in the buffer
zone while still prohibiting counseling and other forms of
importunate speech.
The Ordinance only prohibits
“congregating,”
“patrolling,”
“picketing,”
and
“demonstrating” within the zone. Silent leafleting does not fit
cleanly into “picketing” or “demonstrating,” and clearly is not
covered by “congregating” or “patrolling.” The Ordinance
may be susceptible to a limiting construction in this regard.
52
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McCullen instructs us to be sensitive to context and to
the practical effects of the Ordinance on Plaintiffs’ particular
messaging strategy. The allegations in the Complaint, taken
as true, plausibly establish that the Ordinance burdens
substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve the
City’s legitimate interests. It is up to a factfinder to
determine whether the Ordinance in fact burdens
“substantially” more speech than necessary (or, conversely,
whether alternative measures would burden “substantially”
less speech while still meeting the City’s interests). I disagree
with the majority’s conclusion that the availability of
unexamined, less-restrictive alternatives is sufficient, standing
alone, to establish a constitutional violation. But I cannot
conclude, on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint,
that the Pittsburgh buffer zones operate so differently from
the Massachusetts zones that Plaintiffs cannot advance past
the pleading stage.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment denying the
City’s motion to dismiss the free speech claim.
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